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 Formula Apportionment: 
Factor Allocation and Tax Avoidance 
 
Abstract 
This paper addresses the question of how firms react to tax incentives in a formula 
apportionment (FA) tax regime. Under FA, profits of all consolidated entities of a 
business group are summed and then allocated according to a formula based on FA 
factors. We hypothesize that firms may change the allocation of real production factors 
and/or manipulate the FA factor through tax avoidance strategies. Analyzing FA tax 
effects of the German local business tax with payroll expense as the exclusive FA 
factor, we find empirical evidence consistent with both hypotheses. Regarding the 
allocation of production factors, we observe significant tax effects on labor input at the 
intensive margin but not on labor input at the extensive margin. In addition, we find 
evidence of an indirect FA spillover effect on capital investment. Our findings on tax 
avoidance proxies are consistent with tax-induced manipulations of payroll expense as 
FA factor in order to save tax payments. 
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1 Introduction 
Using firm data at the establishment level, this paper empirically analyzes the impact of 
a payroll formula apportionment (FA) regime on business activity. Under FA, profits of 
all consolidated entities of a business group are summed and then allocated according to 
a formula based on measurable proxies for inputs and/or outputs (e.g., payroll expense, 
sales revenues, fixed assets). Due to the difficulties in calculating arm’s length prices 
for intra-group transactions and the resulting opportunities for firm tax base erosion and 
profit shifting (Dharmapala, 2014), FA has been suggested as an alternative for the 
separate accounting (SA) regime in international taxation (Altshuler & Grubert, 2010, 
Gresik 2010, Nielson et al., 2010, Clausing 2013). Examples include unitary taxation in 
the U.S. and Canada and the concept of the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
(CCCTB) of the European Union. 
While there is a great deal of empirical research on incentive effects of SA tax regimes 
(see Heckemeyer & Feld, 2011, for tax effects on foreign direct investment and 
Dharmapala, 2014, for research on tax avoidance using profit shifting strategies), few 
studies address the impact of FA on business activity (e.g., Gupta & Mills, 2002). Most 
of these studies analyze the U.S. unitary taxation regime using state-level data (Weiner, 
1996, Klassen & Shackelford, 1998, Lightner, 1999, Goolsbee & Maydew, 2000, Gupta 
& Hofmann, 2003). However, our knowledge of FA effects at the firm and 
establishment level is limited. As a result, attempts to assess the budgetary and firm-
specific consequences of introducing FA instead of SA typically do not account for 
behavioral responses (Shackelford & Slemrod, 1998, Devereux & Loretz, 2008, Hines, 
2010, Clausing & Lahav, 2011).1 
From a theoretical perspective, an FA-based income tax can be interpreted as a tax upon 
the FA factors of the apportionment formula (McLure, 1981). It follows that FA factor 
allocations are distorted by tax rate differences (Gordon & Wilson, 1986). In line with 
this argumentation, recent research on the German local business tax, where payroll is 
the exclusive FA factor, interprets correlations between tax rates and payroll costs as 
evidence for a distortion in real business activity (e.g., Riedel, 2010; Thomsen et al., 
2014). FA tax effects are assumed not to be driven by “artificial” tax avoidance 
                                                 
1 An exception is the simulation of Altshuler and Grubert (2010). However, due to the lack of empirical 
research on FA, their simulations are not based on empirically-based estimates but on hypothesized tax 
elasticities. 
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strategies (Riedel & Runkel, 2007, Martini et al., 2012, Clausing, 2013). Clausing and 
Lahav (2011) argue: “While accounting manipulations can easily shift profits of low-tax 
countries under a separate accounting system, that is not the case under a formulary 
system.” By contrast, the German practitioner literature documents a wide range of tax 
avoidance strategies for the FA system of the German local business tax (Dietrich & 
Krakowiak, 2009, Urbahns, 2010, Scheffler, 2011). A main target of these strategies lies 
in manipulation of payroll expense, which is the exclusive FA factor of the German 
regime (see Section 2).2 
We address these issues through detailed analysis of the impact of the German local 
business tax FA regime on (1) allocation of real labor input at the extensive margin and 
the intensive margin, (2) spillover effects on investment and output, and (3) tax 
avoidance strategies affecting payroll expense but not real input and/or output. The 
German local business tax is raised by German municipalities; there is wide variation in 
tax rates in the cross section and over time. Our analysis is based on a unique firm panel 
with detailed information on the FA factor (payroll expense), real labor input (number 
of employees, number of working hours), capital input (investment expense), and output 
(sales revenues) on the establishment level. Using this data, we are able to perform a 
much more detailed investigation of FA effects on business activity than existing 
empirical studies. An additional benefit of our analysis lies in the fact that payroll 
expense is the only FA factor of the German local business tax. Therefore, we can 
identify spillover effects on output (measured by sales revenues) and capital input 
(measured by investment expense). 
Confirming existing research using firm-level tax data (Riedel, 2010; Thomsen et al., 
2014), we obtain a significant negative correlation of the tax rate differential (difference 
of the tax rate of establishment i and the average tax rate) and payroll expense as the FA 
factor. However, analyzing real labor input, FA effects are significant only for the 
number of working hours and not for the number of employees. We also provide 
evidence for FA spillover effects on related variables. Corresponding to our results for 
the small-group subsample (firms with less than four establishments per entity), FA 
distorts not only the allocation of labor input, but also capital input as a complementary 
                                                 
2 For example, businesses may “lease” employees from low-tax establishments to high-tax 
establishments, as such leasing contracts will not increase the payroll expense in high-tax municipalities. 
Further, businesses may “outsource” employees working in high-tax jurisdictions to subsidiaries that are 
not part of the FA scheme. 
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production factor.3 Furthermore, we investigate proxy variables for tax avoidance. 
Assuming that tax avoidance strategies have a stronger impact on payroll expense than 
on our measures for real input or output, our results are consistent with FA tax 
avoidance strategies having an impact on payroll expense at the establishment level. 
Our paper enriches the existing literature in several ways. First, extending the scarce 
literature on firm reactions to FA, we provide evidence not only on the overall FA effect 
on payroll expense, but on the different transmission channels. While the U.S.-based 
literature provides evidence for FA tax effects on employment (Lightner, 1999, 
Goolsbee & Maydew, 2000) and investment (Weiner, 1996, Gupta & Hofmann, 2003), 
firm-level evidence on the transmission channels is still missing. Complementing 
existing research using firm-level tax data (Riedel, 2010), this is the first paper to 
generate evidence on a distortion of real production factors at the firm level. In so 
doing, we find a significant impact on labor input at the intensive margin (number of 
working hours), but not on labor input at the extensive margin (number of employees). 
An explanation for this outcome might be the strong legal protections for German 
employees (e.g., dismissal protection regulations; see Sá, 2008, Forsyth, 2009), which 
limit the ability of German employers to engage in tax-driven labor force adjustments. 
As a result, FA tax effects on payroll expense do not necessarily imply physical 
reallocation of employees. Taking into account the strong employee protection 
legislation in most European countries (Sá, 2008), similar effects might be expected for 
a CCCTB at the European level. 
Second, we find evidence for spillover effects of the FA labor input distortion on 
investment. This result suggests that FA tax regimes may distort not only the 
corresponding FA factors but also other related variables. This finding should be 
relevant for the on-going theoretical debate over which factors are optimal for an FA 
scheme (Anand & Sansing, 2000, Riedel & Runkel, 2007, De Waegenaere & Sansing 
2008, Gresik, 2010; Nielson et al., 2010, Runkel & Schjelderup, 2011). For example, if 
labor and capital are closely correlated as complements, this limits opportunities for FA 
tax policy to attract capital investment via a low weight on capital as an FA factor. 
                                                 
3 In unreported regressions for firms with only two establishments (two-establishment subsample), we 
also find weak evidence for spillover effects of labor input on output (measured by sales revenues). 
However, this outcome is not robust in our baseline specification and should be interpreted with caution. 
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Third, we analyze whether firms use more or less “artificial” tax avoidance strategies in 
an FA regime. Whereas it is challenging to find direct evidence for FA tax avoidance, 
our results on tax avoidance proxies suggest a tax-induced manipulation of payroll 
expense as FA factor. While the allocation of income among jurisdictions under SA tax 
regimes is strongly affected by profit shifting strategies of multinationals (Dharmapala, 
2014), FA has been regarded as less vulnerable to tax avoidance practices (Riedel & 
Runkel, 2007, Altshuler & Grubert, 2010, Clausing & Lahav, 2011, Martini et al., 2012, 
Clausing, 2013). Taking into account evidence on FA tax avoidance for the sales factor 
in the U.S. (Klassen & Shackelford, 1998, Gupta & Mills, 2002), payroll expense may 
appear to be a particularly suitable and tax-planning robust apportionment factor. 
However, as documented by Buettner et al. (2011), firms may use consolidation rules of 
an FA regime to optimally rely either on FA or on SA (as FA is only relevant for 
consolidated firms). Extending these authors’ findings, we generate evidence consistent 
with firms manipulating payroll expenses within the FA scheme to minimize their tax 
burden. Thus, the introduction of FA will presumably not “stop” tax avoidance 
strategies but rather change tax avoidance techniques. Hence, our paper also contributes 
to the broad literature on tax avoidance (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010) via its focus on 
avoidance mechanisms in an FA scheme. 
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present the German local business tax 
and the corresponding FA regulations. Section 3 presents our theoretical considerations 
and hypotheses. Section 4 introduces the data and the regression model. Regression 
results are reported in Section 5. Finally, we set forth our conclusions in Section 6. 
2 The German local business tax and FA 
Domestic business profits of the majority of German firms4 are subject to a local 
business tax. While the German parliament and the Federal Council of Germany enact 
the uniform tax code, each German municipality has the authority to set the local tax 
rate. The high number of municipalities (12,266 over the sampling period) guarantees 
strong variation in tax rates used for econometric analysis. The local tax rate is 
calculated by a uniform basic rate (German: Messzahl, 3.5% since 2008) and a variable 
local business tax multiplier (German: Hebesatz). Figure 1 provides an overview of the 
                                                 
4 Exceptions exist for sole proprietorships and partnerships with earnings from agriculture, forestry and 
learned academic professions (e.g., self-employed doctors, tax advisers, architects, engineers). These 
types of businesses are not taxed by the German local business tax. 
5 
distribution of local tax rates in Germany in 2008, which is the final year of our data set. 
There is considerable variation in tax rates in the cross section. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
In 2004, a minimum local business tax multiplier of 2 (200%, as described by the 
German Local Business Tax Code) was introduced. The German business tax reform of 
2008/2009 slightly reduced the basic rate from 5% to 3.5% and abolished the tax 
deductibility of the local business tax from taxable profit.5 Current local business tax 
rates typically range from 7% (local business tax multiplier of 2) to 17.15% (local 
business tax multiplier of 4.9). There are very few outliers (current maximum rate of 
31.5% in Dierfeld). Accounting for the higher basic rate of 5% and the tax deductibility 
of the local business tax from its own tax base, historical tax rates before 2008 were 
slightly higher (9.09% for a tax multiplier of 2 and 19.68% for a local tax multiplier of 
4.9). The local business tax base is based on modified profit. The most important 
modification is the addition of a fraction of interests, leases, and rents paid. To avoid 
double taxation, there also exist exemptions for distributed profits and dividends. 
For our identification strategy, a crucial feature of the local business tax is the payroll 
FA system. For firms with multiple establishments in different German municipalities 
(hereafter, multi-establishment firms), the local business tax base is usually apportioned 
according to the establishments’ payroll shares.6 In consolidated tax groups, subsidiaries 
are also treated as establishments. The relevant payroll per employee is limited to 
€50,000  for FA purposes. Trainees’ wages, tax-exempt wage payments, and profit-
related bonuses are disregarded. The local business tax base must be declared to the 
central tax authorities, which calculate and allocate the local business tax and perform 
random tax audits. Usually, tax audits are not conducted by the municipalities but by the 
German states. Therefore, the German fiscal authorities have no strong incentive to 
audit the allocation of local business taxes to different municipalities (Becker & Fuest, 
2010, Gresik, 2011). Anecdotal evidence (Scheffler 2011) suggests a weak audit system 
for payroll FA in Germany. 
                                                 
5 Before 2008, the German local business tax therefore reduced the tax base of the (corporate and/or 
personal) income tax as well as its own tax base. 
6 Under certain conditions (e.g., wind power stations), there are also special apportionment schemes, 
which are not based on payroll expense (Scheffler, 2011). Considering their limited scope of application, 
these special regimes are not relevant for our analysis. 
6 
The German practitioner literature discusses a wide range of tax avoidance strategies to 
manipulate payroll expense as an FA factor (Dietrich & Krakowiak, 1999, Scheffler, 
2011). One important tool is the leasing of employees from one (official) entity to work 
for another (effective) entity. Since leasing fees for employees are not considered by the 
FA scheme of the German local business tax, this is a powerful strategy to shift payroll 
expense to a low-tax municipality (via the official entity) for employees working in a 
high-tax municipality (for the effective entity). In addition, employees may be on the 
payroll list of one establishment, while effectively working for another one. This should 
be especially relevant for employees working in more than one establishment 
(discretion in cost allocation). Such strategies fit well with empirical evidence on tax-
motivated cost allocation (Yetman, 2001). Furthermore, employees may be 
“outsourced” to subsidiaries, which are not part of the FA regime (non-consolidation for 
FA tax purposes) and can therefore be used for profit shifting in an SA context. 
From an empirical perspective, the German local business tax has a number of notable 
advantages when testing the impact of FA systems on real business activity. First, the 
German local business tax uses payroll expense as the single FA factor, which 
simplifies analysis and allows identification of spillover effects on investment and 
output. Second, the local business tax code is uniform in all German municipalities. 
Therefore, we may focus simply on the variation in tax rates to identify the impact of 
payroll FA on the allocation of labor input. Third, we have a wide variation in tax rates 
over time and in the cross section. Tax rates range from 0% (before 2004) to more than 
30% across the period. On average, about 8% of the 12,266 municipalities change their 
local tax rate each year, providing sufficient variation in tax rates over time. This is 
documented in Figure 2. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
3 Theory and hypotheses 
As suggested by McLure (1981), income taxes raised by FA can be interpreted as taxes 
on the corresponding FA factors. In the case of Germany, payroll expense is the only 
FA factor. Thus, the average local business income tax rate of a multi-establishment 
firm   is the weighted sum of tax rates i  with the payroll share of an establishment i 
as the weighting factor. Corresponding to the theoretical literature (Gordon & Wilson, 
1986, Anand & Sansing, 2000, Nielsen et al., 2010), the tax rate will distort the FA 
factor cost and consequently the factor input. Therefore, we focus on Payroll sharei of 
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Payroll expense Payroll expense   with the number of 
establishments I). 
We use the tax rate differential TaxDi as a measure for FA tax incentives. TaxDi is 
defined as the difference between the tax rate of establishment i, i , and the average tax 
rate over all other establishments J of the same entity  i i JTaxD    .7 Since a 
positive (negative) tax rate differential sets an incentive to shift payroll away from (into) 
the establishment, we hypothesize: 
H1:  The Payroll share of an establishment is negatively correlated with the tax rate 
differential. 
While the literature (e.g., Riedel, 2010, Thomsen et al., 2014) interprets the correlation 
of Payroll share and the tax rate differential entirely as evidence for a reallocation of 
real labor inputs, this is not the only possible response from taxpayers. As documented 
by Dietrich and Krakowiak (2009), Urbahns (2010), and Scheffler (2011), there is a 
wide range of FA tax avoidance strategies that affects payroll expense without changing 
real labor inputs. Further, existing evidence does not provide information on the 
channels for a reallocation of production factors at the firm level (Lightner, 1999, 
Goolsbee & Maydew, 2000, Gupta & Hofmann, 2003, Riedel, 2010). To identify the 
impact of the German FA local business tax rate regime on real labor inputs, we rely on 
measures of labor input at the extensive margin and the intensive margin. 
Similar to Payroll share, we use the share of employees of establishment i to the total 
number of employees (Employee share) as a measure for labor input at the extensive 
margin. For labor input at the intensive margin, we use the ratio of working hours per 






Working hours EmployeesHours per employee ratio
Working hours Employees
     . While 
this ratio is not a “share” in the true sense, it is a relative measure ranging from zero to 
1. Thus, it has similar statistical properties (e.g., mean, standard error; see Table 1) as 
our “share” measures (Payroll share, Employee share), which simplifies the 
comparability of regression coefficients. We assume that both measures for real labor 
                                                 
7 Riedel (2010) uses a weighted tax rate differential with sales revenues as weighing factor. However, in 
our study such a measure would not be appropriate as it considers the tax wedge between the tax rate of 
establishment i and the average tax rate on profit but not the shifting incentive resulting from different 
marginal tax rates in different municipalities.  
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input are negatively affected by the shifting incentive measured by the tax rate 
differential. 
H2a:  The Employee share of an establishment is negatively correlated with the tax 
rate differential. 
H2b:  The Hours per employee ratio of an establishment is negatively correlated with 
the tax rate differential. 
As an alternative identification strategy for FA effects on the allocation of real input 
factors, we analyze spillover effects of labor inputs on output and capital input. 
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function with output (sales revenues)  ;i i iS L K  





     
, an adjustment of labor input Li will result in a corresponding 
adjustment of output Si and capital input Ki. For example, if German FA tax incentives 
reduce labor input, we should also observe a reduction in output and capital input. Since 
the German FA scheme does not consider sales revenues or capital stock as FA factors, 
both proxies of real business activity should be unaffected by tax avoidance strategies 
intended to manipulate the FA factor (payroll expense). 
We identify these indirect effects of the German FA scheme by investigating the 
correlation between TaxD and Revenue share (ratio of sales revenues of establishment i 
to total sales revenues of the firm) as well as TaxD and Investment share (ratio of gross 
investment in equipment and real estate in establishment i to total gross investment of 
the firm). As profits from foreign operations may be tax-exempt under certain 
conditions,8 Revenue share is based on sales revenues from domestic operations. 
However, we also perform a robustness check considering sales revenues from domestic 
and foreign operations. Investment share is based on gross investment, since our data 
base does not provide information on the capital stock at the establishment level. 
Investment share also accounts for leasing contracts for new equipment and real estate. 
We assume that these secondary spillover effects of TaxD via labor input are delayed by 
one period. Therefore, we use lagged valued of TaxD. 
                                                 
8 Corresponding to § 2 of the German Local Business Tax Code (German: Gewerbesteuergesetz), the tax 
is relevant only for ongoing business operations in Germany. In addition, German businesses may credit 
foreign income taxes against the German local business tax under certain requirements. 
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H3a:  The Revenue share of an establishment is negatively correlated with the once-
lagged tax rate differential. 
H3b:  The Investment share of an establishment is negatively correlated with the once-
lagged tax rate differential. 
Finally, we also analyze tax avoidance strategies of German businesses manipulating 
the FA factor payroll expense without changing the real factor allocation. We assume 
that tax avoidance will affect payroll expense while leaving real labor input or output 
unchanged. Therefore, we investigate correlations between the tax rate differential and 
the ratio of payroll expense to real labor input or output. Following the approach of the 
Hours per employee ratio, we use the following two measures:  
1) ratio of payroll expense per working hour of establishment i to the sum of payroll-





Payroll expense Working hoursPayroll per hour ratio
Payroll expense Working hours
     , 
2) ratio of payroll expense per unit of sales revenue of establishment i to the sum of 






Payroll expense Sales revenuesPayroll per revenue ratio
Payroll expense Sales revenues
     . 
Since both measures have similar statistical properties as our share measures (Payroll 
share, Employee share), corresponding regression coefficients should be comparable in 
terms of size and distribution. Assuming that tax avoidance takes place and that 
therefore, in addition to real input changes, we will observe tax avoidance effects, we 
hypothesize: 
H4a:  The Payroll per hour ratio of establishment is negatively correlated with the tax 
rate differential. 
H4b:  The Payroll per revenue ratio of establishment is negatively correlated with the 
tax rate differential. 
4 Data and empirical strategy 
Our analysis is based on the German AFiD panel (German: Amtliche Firmendaten in 
Deutschland) for the manufacturing and mining industries. These industries contribute 
10 
about one-quarter of the gross value added of the German economy (Destatis 2015). The 
AFiD panel comprises several mandatory business surveys conducted by the German 
Federal Statistical Office (German: Statistisches Bundesamt) and can be accessed by 
remote-data processing (Malchin & Voshage, 2009). The surveys in question, 
conducted between 1995 and 2008, are the Investment Survey and the Monthly Report 
for Manufacturing and Mining Enterprises (both raised on the establishment level).9 We 
rely on the Monthly Report for payroll expense, number of employees, and number of 
working hours per establishment; we rely on the Investment Survey for investment in 
equipment and real estate on the establishment level. Using the German Statistics of Tax 
Multipliers (German: Statistik der Hebesätze) and Regio-Stat information, we 
complement these data with local tax rate panel data at the municipality level and 
information on the economic situation at the district level (GDP per capita, population, 
unemployment rate). This provides us with a unique panel of establishment data 
covering the period from 1995 to 2008. 
Compared to other firm panels like Compustat or AMADEUS, AFiD holds a number of 
major advantages for our analysis. Unlike public accounting data, the Investment 
Survey and the Monthly Report provide very detailed information on the volume and 
composition of payrolls, investments, and sales revenues, and these data are collected at 
the establishment level. Since we complement the data with information on local tax 
rates, we are not only able to analyze correlations between payroll expense and tax 
rates, but also correlations with number of employees, number of working hours per 
employee, sales revenue, gross investment, and measures for tax avoidance (payroll per 
number of hours worked, payroll per unit of sales revenue) on the establishment and 
firm levels. To our knowledge, this is a unique feature, allowing us a more detailed 
analysis than in previous research. Both surveys are conducted as a mandatory census 
for all domestic establishments in the manufacturing and mining industries with at least 
20 employees; therefore, non-response and sample selection are not issues. An 
additional advantage stems from the fact that the data are anonymized and available 
only for political and scientific use. Hence, there should be a smaller incentive for 
survey participants to “brighten the numbers” as in balance sheet information. 
                                                 
9 German titles of the surveys are as follows: „Investitionserhebung bei Betrieben des Verarbeitenden 
Gewerbes sowie der Gewinnung von Steinen und Erden“ and „Monatsbericht bei Betrieben des 
Verarbeitenden Gewerbes sowie der Gewinnung von Steinen und Erden“. 
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A disadvantage of the data set is that it does not provide information on holding 
structures. Thus, we obtain data for the different establishments of one entity, but not 
for subsidiaries or parent companies of that entity. While the data should be excellently 
suited to analyze factor allocations within an entity, they do not enable us to address 
other forms of tax avoidance between different entities of a consolidated business group 
(e.g., profit shifting between different legal entities). Further, the data are restricted to 
the manufacturing industry and the mining sector, and they provide information only on 
gross investment but not on the capital stock. 
The original data include 691,822 observations for business establishments between 
1995 and 2008 that participated in the Investment Survey and the Monthly Report, and 
that provide both firm and establishment IDs. In a first step, we exclude all firms with 
only a single establishment, as FA is generally not relevant for these observations.10  
Second, we exclude observations with missing ID information on firm and/or 
establishment. Third, we drop all observations with missing information on variables 
(including lagged variables). Our final sample comprises 90,678 observations for multi-
jurisdictional establishments in the German manufacturing and mining sectors. Table 1 
summarizes the price-adjusted establishment data (using the German producer price 
index for the manufacturing industry; German Council of Economic Experts 2011). Due 
to confidentiality policies of the German Federal Statistical Office, we are not allowed 
to report maximum and minimum values. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Descriptive statistics point to significant variance and a skewed distribution of 
establishment size. While the average price-adjusted revenue per establishment is €38.9 
million, the median is only €6.7 million. On average, establishments spent about 9% of 
revenues on gross investment and about 22% on payroll expense. The average number 
of employees (3,826) and the median number of employees (985) underline the 
considerable size of the establishments in our data. On average, each employee works 
135.5 hours per month. Descriptive statistics for the tax rate differential show a 
relatively uniform distribution of tax incentives over the 90,678 establishments. 
Average TaxD is almost zero and the number of observations with positive TaxD is very 
close to the number of observations with negative TaxD. For the various “share” and 
                                                 
10 FA may be relevant for consolidated subsidiaries using a group taxation regime. However, our data 
provides neither information on firm ownership and consolidation nor on group taxation regimes. 
Therefore, we focus on legally distinct entities with more than one establishment. 
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“ratio” variables of H1 through H4b, we find very similar statistical properties (see H1 
through H4b). Mean values range from 32.8% (Payroll per revenue ratio) to 35.1% 
(Payroll share) and standard deviations from 20.0% (Investment share) to 32.3% 
(Payroll per revenue ratio). 
We regress payroll expense at the establishment level on tax rate differentials to test H1. 
We use the share of payroll expenses of establishment i to total payroll at the firm level 
as the dependent variable (Payroll shareit = Payroll expenseit / 1
I
j jt
Payroll expense ). 
An advantage of this scaled variable is that it should not be affected by general payroll 
changes at the firm level that are unrelated to allocation of payrolls across 
establishments. Payroll share of establishment i in year t is regressed on the tax rate 
differential TaxDit and covariates 
0 1 2 2it it it it it t i itPayroll share TaxD Payroll share E D u                   (1) 
with the error term itu . 
We use the tax rate differential TaxDit as a measure for the tax incentive. TaxDit is 
defined as the difference between the local business the tax rate it  of establishment i 




Jt jtj j ì
J    with J denoting the number of establishments 
excluding i): it it JtTaxD    . To calculate the tax rate differential, we refer to an 
unweighted average tax rate. 
We consider year-fixed effects t  to account for economic trends and shocks, and 
establishment fixed effects i  to detect unobserved heterogeneity of the establishments. 
itE  describes a vector of additional control variables at the establishment level. 
Supplementing twice-lagged Payroll shareit-2, we consider twice-lagged Investment 
shareit-2 and twice-lagged Revenue shareit-2 to obtain a robust set of control variables for 
establishment size. itD  is a vector of control variables at the district level, including 
unemployment (local unemployment rate in percentage points), GDP per capita 
(logarithm of price-adjusted GDP per capita in euro) and population (logarithm of the 
population) in a district. Hypotheses H2a through H4b are tested by a generalized 
version of equation (1) 
0 1 2 2 .it it it it it t i itY TaxD Y E D u                   (2) 
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As dependent variables Yit, we use Employee shareit for H2a, Hours per employee ratioit 
for H2b, Revenue shareit for H3a, Investment shareit for H3b, Payroll per hour ratioit 
for H4a and Payroll per revenue ratioit for H4b. Since we assume delayed spillover 
effects, we use a once-lagged TaxDit-1 for Revenue shareit and Investment shareit. A 
documentation of regression variables is found in Table 2. 
[Table 2 about here] 
One problem with our estimation strategy stems from the ambiguity of tax avoidance 
incentives for firms with a high number of establishments. For example, a firm with five 
establishments, of which one establishment is in a high-tax municipality, has the 
opportunity to shift payroll expense from the high-tax establishment to four other 
establishments, as well as among these four other establishments. In a world without 
non-tax costs, the firm would simply reallocate payroll to the establishment with the 
lowest local business tax rate. However, reallocation of payroll generates non-tax costs 
(e.g., the costs of production inefficiency) and tax avoidance costs (e.g., tax adviser 
fees, tax avoidance risk), which are not observable in our data. In addition, alternative 
tax avoidance strategies (e.g., from the implicit option between SA and FA as discussed 
by Buettner et al., 2011) should be more valuable for larger entities with a high number 
of establishments. Therefore, identification of FA tax effects should be more difficult 
for firms with a higher number of establishments. 
Accordingly, we initially focus on a subsample with a low number of establishments. In 
order to account for different payroll shifting incentives for firms with many 
establishments as well as to generate subsamples of sufficient size, we decided on a 
subsample of entities with up to three establishments (small-group subsample, 52,542 
observations). This subsample should be best-suited for a detailed analysis of the 
various FA effects. Descriptive statistics of the small-group subsample (< four 
establishments) and the remaining large-group subsample (≥ four establishments, 
38,136 observations) are provided in Table 3. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Establishments in the two subsamples are very similar to each other for such variables 
as monthly working hours per employee, local tax rate, tax rate differential, and regional 
economic properties (e.g., unemployment rates). Differences exist for establishment size 
and allocation of input and output variables among different business units. 
Establishments of large-group firms are bigger in terms of sales revenue, gross 
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investment and payroll expense. Further, driven by the higher number of establishments, 
mean values of our relative “share” and “ratio” variables are smaller. Due to the higher 
heterogeneity of the large-group subsample, standard deviations of our regression 
variables (e.g., Payroll share) are relatively high compared to mean values. 
5 Results 
5.1 FA effects on payroll expense 
As a first step, we estimate regression model (1) to confirm existing evidence on a 
negative and significant correlation between the tax rate differential (TaxD) and Payroll 
share (Riedel, 2010; Thomsen et al., 2014). In so doing, we address the question of 
whether the correlation becomes more obvious for the subsample of firms with few 
establishments (small-group subsample). Therefore, we estimate (1) for a) the full 
sample, b) the small-group subsample (entities with less than four establishments), and 
c) the large-group subsample (entities with at least four establishments). We also 
estimate models for the full sample including an interaction term of TaxD and a measure 
of group size. Hence, we test whether tax effects in the large-group subsample differ 
significantly from the results of the small-group subsample. As variables for group size, 
we consider a dummy variable for the small-group subsample (Small group), the 
number of establishments (Establishments), and the logarithm of the number of 
establishments (LN(Establishments)). The partial tax effect is identified by the 
interaction term of group size and TaxD (e.g., TaxD x Small group). Estimations are 
performed by ordinary least squares (OLS) in a fixed effect model using robust and 
clustered standard errors at the establishment level. For the calculation of R2, we do not 
account for establishment fixed effects.11 Results are documented by Table 4. 
[Table 4 about here] 
Confirming the literature (Riedel, 2010; Thomsen et al., 2014) as well as H1, we obtain 
a negative and significant correlation of TaxD and Payroll share. Corresponding to our 
estimate for the full sample (1), increasing TaxD by 1 percentage point reduces Payroll 
share by 0.43 percentage points. While we obtain a somewhat higher coefficient for the 
small-group subsample (-0.689), TaxD is not significant for the large-group subsample. 
                                                 
11 R2 is calculated on the basis of “xtreg”-models of our STATA package. This means that the explanatory 
power of establishment-fixed effects is not considered for the calculation of R2. Thus, the model provides 
R2-measures over time (within-R2) and for the overall model (overall-R2) for the variation, which has not 
already been explained by establishment-fixed effects. Considering the explanatory power of these fixed 
effects would result in significantly higher (adjusted) R2-values. 
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Thus, TaxD has less explanatory power for firms with a high number of establishments. 
In spite of this, the models that include interaction terms do not provide significant 
evidence for stronger FA effects of the small-group subsample. While the coefficient of 
TaxD remains stable in models (4) to (6) in Table 4, none of the tested interaction terms 
is significant. 
Calculating semi-elasticities, the outcome of models (4) to (6) fits well the coefficients 
of TaxD in models (1) and (2). If we compare the regression coefficients of TaxD to the 
corresponding mean values of Payroll share in the subsamples (see Table 1 and Panel A 
of Table 3), the underlying semi-elasticities for a one-percentage-point tax change range 
from 1.40% (= 0.689/0.4925) for the small-group subsample to 1.22%  
(= 0.430/0.3511) for the full sample. Hence, both elasticities seem to be in the same 
range. Concluding, the results of Table 4 suggest that FA tax effects can be identified 
more easily for the small-group subsample. However, considering elasticity estimates 
and insignificant interaction terms of TaxD and group size, the models do not generate 
evidence for a difference of FA tax effects between the small-group subsample and the 
large-group subsample. 
5.2 Factor allocation, spillover effects, and tax avoidance 
Let us now turn to our main analysis of FA effects on factor allocation and tax 
avoidance. As described in Section 3, we use six variables as measures of FA effects on 
business activity. While FA effects on real labor input at the extensive margin and at the 
intensive margin are measured by Employee share and the Hours per employee ratio, 
FA spillover effects on output and investment (capital input) are considered through 
Revenue share and Investment share. Finally, tax avoidance strategies affecting payroll 
expense without affecting real labor input or output are identified by the Payroll per 
hour ratio and by the Payroll per revenue ratio. 
Considering Table 4, our main focus is on the subsample with the more robust 
regression results for Payroll share (small-group subsample with less than four 
establishments). Corresponding results are provided in Table 5. Notwithstanding, we 
also report results for the full sample (Table 6). Corresponding to Table 4, there is no 
evidence of a TaxD effect for the large-group subsample. Hence, we abstain from 
reporting results. 
[Table 5 about here] 
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While the coefficient for Employee share is insignificant, the coefficient for the Hours 
per payroll ratio has a similar value as the coefficient of Payroll share and is 
significant. Hence, we generate empirical evidence for an impact of FA on real labor 
inputs at the firm level. However, this effect is mainly caused by an adjustment of 
average working hours and not by an adjustment of the labor force (as suggested by 
Lightner, 1999, and Goolsbee & Maydew, 2000). This outcome is robust and remains 
constant for the full sample (Table 6) and robustness checks (Subsection 5.3). 
Therefore, it remains questionable whether German FA effects on business activity have 
a significant impact on German labor markets. Further, long-run FA effects on real 
labor input may be smaller than the short-run effects, as the number of working hours 
per employee should be restricted to a certain limit. An obvious explanation for our 
finding is the institutional structure of the German labor market. Compared to the U.S., 
Germany has strong employment protection rules for businesses with at least 10 
employees. In addition, unions have a strong position in the German labor market, and 
worker participation is an important aspect of the German corporate governance system 
(Sá, 2008, Forsyth, 2009). Thus, it may well be that the German labor force is not 
flexible enough to be strongly affected by an FA tax incentive. 
Regarding FA spillover effects, we use once-lagged TaxD as the dependent variable, to 
account for a delay of the indirect effects. We calculate an insignificant coefficient for 
Revenue share and a negative and significant coefficient for Investment share. Hence, 
while we find evidence for spillover effects of labor input on investment, results for 
spillover effects on output are generally not significant.12 Our outcome suggests that 
labor and capital are, on average, complementary input factors. While the coefficient of 
Investment share is similar to the coefficient of the Hours per employee ratio (-0.529 
compared to -0.633), the indirect FA effect on capital input is significantly smaller than 
the direct FA effect on labor input. The reason for this is that Investment share measures 
the share of investments (dynamic variable) and not the share of capital stock (static 
variable). If, for example, gross investment amounts to 20% of capital stock, a tax-
induced change of investment by 1% would result in a change of capital stock by only 
0.2%. 
                                                 
12 In an unreported cross check, we also tested the impact of TaxD on Revenue share only for firms with 
two establishments (two-establishment subsample with 38,126 observations). In these regressions we 
obtain a coefficient of -0.458, which is significant at the 10% level. However, corresponding results are 
neither robust for the small-group subsample nor for the full sample. 
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The negative and significant results for the Payroll per hour ratio and the Payroll per 
revenue ratio document that the impact of TaxD on the FA factor payroll expense is 
stronger than FA impacts on input and output measures. This constitutes evidence for 
the existence of more or less artificial tax avoidance strategies that do not result from a 
reallocation of real labor input (see also Section 2). Our regression results imply that tax 
avoidance may be an important element of the overall FA effect on payroll. Comparing 
the range of coefficients of tax avoidance measures (-0.545 to -0.929) with the effect on 
working hours (-0.633), tax avoidance may be responsible for a significant part of the 
overall impact of TaxD on Payroll share.13 Considering that our tax avoidance measures 
are probably not appropriate to identify all tax avoidance strategies, tax avoidance may 
even be responsible for a major part of the FA impact. However, as it is very hard to 
measure tax avoidance under an FA system directly and consequently our proxies are 
indirect measures for tax avoidance, the results have to be interpreted with due caution. 
An alternative explanation for a tax-driven reduction of payroll expense without a 
corresponding change in the underlying real input measure (number of working hours) 
or output measure (sales revenues) might be tax incidence. It has been argued that 
businesses may impose the local tax burden on their employees by reducing gross 
wages (Fuest et al., 2013). However, taking into account the binding force of labor 
market contracts and the tariff commitment of most German industries (especially in the 
manufacturing sector), this does not seem to be a likely explanation for the strong 
immediate tax effects on the Payroll per hour ratio found in our paper. While 
employment and incidence effects of taxes should have delayed effects (Fuest et al., 
2013, Siegloch, 2014), our regression results rather imply a rapid effect from the tax 
rate differential on Payroll share, the Payroll per hour ratio and the Payroll per 
revenue ratio. Therefore, we find stronger effects of current TaxD on payroll compared 
to lagged TaxD.14 Since Fuest et al. (2013) argue that, due to collective rent dividing 
                                                 
13 Taking into account the tax-induced reduction of workings hours per employee, one might argue that 
part of the lower Payroll per hour ratio might be due to a reduction in overtime hours with corresponding 
overtime compensation. Taking into account that an increase in the tax rate by one percentage point 
reduces the Hours per employee ratio by 0.633 percentage points and the Payroll per hour ratio by 
almost the same value (0.545 percentage points), the impact of overtime compensation should be almost 
negligible. An adjustment of working hours by a small fraction (e.g., 0.6%) will not result in a noteworthy 
change in the average payroll over all working hours. Even for an extremely high overtime compensation 
of 100%, a change in working hours of 0.6% will result in a change in average payroll per working hour 
of only 0.006%. 
14 This is documented by a comparison of our baseline regression results in Table 4 (Payroll share) and 
Table 8 (other dependent variables) with the corresponding results for lagged TaxD in Table 7 (Payroll 
share) and Table 9 (other dependent variables). 
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negotiations, the tax burden is shifted particularly to workers under collective wage 
agreements, we would expect this effect to be stronger for firms with many 
establishments. However, we do not observe this pattern in our results. Note that Fuest 
et al. (2013) perform calculations for payroll per employee and not for payroll per 
working hour. Hence, their calculations might be biased by changes in the number of 
working hours, as suggested by Table 5 and Table 6. 
In Table 6, we document our regression results for the full sample (all firms). In line 
with our assumption on a more effective identification strategy for our small-group 
subsample, we find a smaller number of significant tax effects on measures of factor 
allocation and tax avoidance. Notwithstanding, the general implications of these 
regressions are largely the same as in Table 5. We obtain negative and significant TaxD-
coefficients for the Hours per employee ratio (as the measure for real labor input) and 
Payroll per revenue ratio (as the measure for tax avoidance). However, we do not find 
significant spillover effects for Investment share. Therefore, our result of an FA 
spillover effect on capital stock is significant only for the small-group sample 
(maximum of three establishments). 
[Table 6 about here] 
5.3 Robustness checks 
We estimate several additional models to control for the robustness of our findings. 
Robustness checks are calculated for Payroll share (Table 7) as well as for the variables 
measuring FA effects for factor allocation and tax avoidance (Table 8 to Table 10). For 
simplicity, we concentrate on the main variables of interest and do not report control 
variables. We consider three types of robustness checks. 
First, we rerun the regressions without including establishment controls. This is for two 
reasons: 1) we analyze the robustness of correlations when important control variables 
are excluded; 2) we test whether including twice-lagged values of the dependent 
variables in our standard regression models affects regression results. While our R2-
measures are much smaller for the models that exclude establishment controls, we 
obtain largely the same results for TaxD. 
Second, we test whether the dynamic structure is estimated correctly. It may be argued 
that a change in tax rates has a generally delayed effect for all variables (e.g., Payroll 
share). In addition, one may argue that spillover effects are not delayed by one year. 
Thus, we consider once-lagged values of TaxD for Payroll share and all other 
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dependent variables for which current TaxD is used in the standard regressions. By 
contrast, we consider current TaxD instead of lagged TaxD for Revenue share and 
Investment share. Results remain broadly unchanged. However, the estimated effects 
are generally smaller and less significant compared to our standard models. This holds 
particularly for Investment share. Therefore, our standard regression models appear to 
consider the temporal dynamics better than the robustness test. We also test 
(unreported) models for longer time lags and find similar implications. 
Third, our baseline models might be biased by the fact that we only account for sales 
revenues of domestic operations as dependent variables (e.g, Revenue per hour ratio) 
and control variables (e.g., twice-lagged Revenue share). Therefore, we perform a 
robustness check accounting for the aggregate sum of sales revenues from domestic 
operations and sales revenues from foreign operations. Our results remain broadly 
unchanged. In fact, the impact of TaxD on the dependent variables (e.g., Payroll per 
revenue ratio) seems to be even slightly stronger within these models. 
Regression results for the three different types of robustness checks are provided by 
Table 7 for Payroll share. In Tables 8 through 10, we document corresponding 
robustness checks for our measures on factor allocation and tax avoidance. Within these 
regressions we account for the small-group subsample (panel A) and the full sample 
(panel B). 
[Table 7 about here] 
[Table 8 about here] 
[Table 9 about here] 
[Table 10 about here] 
6 Conclusion 
We address the question of how multi-establishment firms react to a payroll 
apportionment regime. Our analysis is based on a unique panel of establishments in the 
German manufacturing and mining sector. Confirming previous firm-level evidence, we 
find that changes in the tax rate differential are significantly and negatively correlated 
with the allocation of payroll among constituent establishments of a firm. Therefore, 
firms shift payroll away from high-tax establishments to low-tax establishments to 
optimize overall tax burden. A one-percentage-point increase in the difference between 
the local business tax rate of an establishment and the average tax rate of the firm (tax 
20 
rate differential) decreases the Payroll share of the establishment by 0.43 to 0.69 
percentage points, or about 1.2% to 1.4%. 
Extending the literature, we analyze the impact of FA on the allocation of real labor 
input, spillover effects on investment and output, and tax avoidance strategies. Our main 
focus is on a subsample with a small number of establishments that facilitates 
identification of FA tax effects due to clear incentives. We find a significant impact of 
the German FA regime on labor input at the intensive margin (number of working hours 
per employee), but not on labor input at the extensive margin (number of employees). 
This outcome may be driven partially by the inflexibility of the German labor market 
(e.g., strong dismissal protection) and suggests a limited impact of the German FA tax 
regime on recruitment of employees. For the small-group subsample (< four 
establishments per firm), we also find evidence for spillover effects of the payroll-based 
German FA tax regime on gross investment in equipment and real estate. Therefore, by 
distorting labor input, FA tax regimes may also indirectly distort the capital stock. All in 
all, our findings suggest that the German FA tax regime has a significant impact on the 
allocation of real production factors. 
Further, our results are consistent with tax avoidance taking place in addition to real 
payroll shifting. We show that the distortion of the FA factor payroll expense 
significantly exceeds the distortion of the corresponding measures of real input (number 
of working hours) and output (sales revenues). Hence, firms may find ways to adjust the 
payroll FA factor without adjusting real business activity. This outcome challenges the 
assertions in the literature that FA taxation may be robust to aggressive tax avoidance 
strategies. Introducing FA instead of SA for international taxation (e.g., in the form of a 
CCCTB on the European level) may therefore restrict profit shifting, but also provide 
new tax avoidance opportunities in addition to real factor shifting. From this 
perspective, “fine-tuning” international tax systems (e.g., by introducing thin-
capitalization rules) to narrow tax loopholes may be as relevant as the more general 
question of SA or FA. 
Finally, we point out several limitations of our paper. We provide a detailed analysis of 
the German local business tax FA regime for the German manufacturing and mining 
sector. While the manufacturing and mining sector is an important part of the German 
economy, our findings may not be representative for other FA tax regimes and other 
industries (e.g., due to different production processes and investment adjustment costs). 
Nevertheless, we are convinced that our main propositions on FA tax effects on factor 
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allocation and tax avoidance should also be interesting in a broader context. These 
primary results hold for the full sample as well as for the small-group subsample. By 
contrast, we find FA spillover effects only for the small-group subsample. While this 
lack of significant evidence might result from a more tricky identification of tax effects 
for large-group entities, we nevertheless cannot rule out that FA spillover effects are 
relevant only for firms with a limited number of establishments. Hence, more empirical 
research on these issues (e.g., for other countries or industries) is most welcome. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. N 
Sales revenue (1,000 euro) 38,892.27 6,736.57 199,851.91 90,678 
Gross investment (1,000 euro) 3,542.40 290.40 25,446.08 90,678 
Payroll expense (1,000 euro) 8,601.54 1,692.95 46,967.13 90,678 
Number of employees 3,826.23 985.00 16,122.54 90,678 
Monthly hours per employee 135.49 133.03 27.32 90,678 
Local business tax rate 0.1546 0.0191 0.1525 90,678 
TaxD (tax rate differential) -0.0003 0.0000 0.0198 90,678 
TaxD ≥ 0 0.0142 0.0109 0.0131 46,433 
TaxD < 0 -0.0156 -0.0121 0.0129 44,245 
Payroll share 0.3511 0.2658 0.2979 90,678 
Employee share 0.3463 0.2598 0.2912 90,678 
Hours per employee ratio 0.3440 0.3384 0.2112 90,678 
Revenue share 0.3478 0.3374 0.2353 90,678 
Investment share 0.3491 0.3580 0.2000 90,678 
Payroll per hour ratio 0.3468 0,3388 0.2269 90,678 
Payroll per revenue ratio 0.3282 0.2549 0.3225 90,678 
Unemployment rate (district level) 0.1054  0.0920 0.0481 90,678 
GDP per capita (district level) 26,453 23,726 11,073 90,678 
Population (district level) 332,160 198,964 481,340 90,678 
Notes: AFiD panel industrial units of the manufacturing industry; price-adjusted data; own calculations. 
 
Table 2: Definitions of regression variables  
Variable Definition 
Payroll shareit Payroll of establishment i and year t divided by sum of payrolls of all establishments i 
= 0 to I 
Employee 
shareit 
Number of employees of establishment i and year t divided by sum of employees of all 
establishments i = 0 to I 
Hours per 
employee ratioit 
Average working hours per employee in establishment i and year t divided by sum of 
average working hours per employee over all establishments i = 0 to I 
Revenue shareit Sales revenue of establishment i and year t divided by total sales revenue of all 
establishments i = 0 to I  
Investment 
shareit 
Investment in fixed assets in establishment i and year t divided by sum of investments 
in fixed assets over all establishments i = 0 to I  
Payroll per hour 
ratioit 
Average payroll per number of working hours in establishment i and year t divided by 
sum of average payroll per number of working hours over all establishments i = 0 to I 
Payroll per 
revenue ratioit 
Average payroll per sales revenue in establishment i and year t divided by the sum of 
average payroll per sales revenue over all establishments i = 0 to I 
TaxDit Difference between tax rate of establishment i in year t and the unweighted average 
tax rate of all other establishments.  
Unemploymentit Unemployment rate of district of establishment i in year t in percentage points 
GDP per capitait Natural logarithm of gross domestic product per capita of district of establishment i in 
year t 




Table 3: Descriptive statistics for subsamples 
Panel A: Small groups (< four establishments) Mean Median Std. Dev. N 
Sales revenues (1,000 euro) 31,651.72 7,349.57 157,414.96 52,542 
Gross investments (1,000 euro) 2,735.99 346.06 19,660.29 52,542 
Payroll expense (1,000 euro) 6,478.32 1,834.66 31,614.51 52,542 
Number of employees 3,028,62 1,079,00 11,538,28 52,542 
Monthly hours per employee 134.35 131.76 24.76 52,542 
Local business tax rate 0.1528 0.0185 0.1489 52,542 
TaxD (tax rate differential) -0.0005 0.0000 0.0215 52,542 
TaxD ≥ 0 0.0145 0.0107 0.0144 28,011 
TaxD < 0 -0.0176 -0.0139 0.0143 24,531 
Payroll share 0.4925 0.4775 0.2893 52,542 
Employee share 0.4868 0.4741 0.2791 52,542 
Hours per employee ratio 0.4843 0.4905 0.1462 52,542 
Revenue share 0.4892 0.3495 0.4727 52,542 
Investment share 0.4901 0.3696 0.4730 52,542 
Payroll per hour ratio 0.4886 0.4846 0.1760 52,542 
Payroll per revenue ratio 0.4629 0.4536   0.3183 52,542 
Unemployment rate (percent, district level) 0.1018 0.0880 0.0476 52,542 
GDP per capita (district level) 25,799 23,619 10,203 52,542 
Population (district level) 315,657 194,169 455,311 52,542 
Panel B: Large groups (≥ four establishments) Mean Median Std. Dev. N 
Sales revenues (1,000 euro) 48,867.97 5,609.63 246,290.04 38,136 
Gross investments (1,000 euro) 4,653.43 211.53 31,700.99 38,136 
Payroll expense (1,000 euro) 11,526.82 1,384.55 62,075.61 38,136 
Number of employees 4,925 797 20.798 38,136 
Monthly hours per employee 137.06 134.65 30.43 38,136 
Local business tax rate 0.1570 0.0196 0.1561 38,136 
TaxD (tax rate differential) -0.0002 -0.0009 0.0172 38.136   
TaxD ≥ 0 0.0138 0.0115 0.0108 18,422 
TaxD < 0 -0.0132 -0.0108 0.0105   19,714 
Payroll share 0.1562 0.0963   0.1738 38,136 
Employee share 0.1527 0.0912 0.1719 38,136 
Hours per employee ratio 0.1507 0.1423 0.1100 38,136 
Revenue share 0.1530 0.0849 0.1924 38,136 
Investment share 0.1548 0.0508 0.2268 38,136 
Payroll per hour ratio 0.1516 0.1378 0.1183 38,136 
Payroll per revenue ratio 0,1426 0.0617 0.2199 38,136 
Unemployment rate (district level) 0.1104 0.0980 0.0484 38,136 
GDP per capita (district level) 27,352 23,858 12,113 38,136 
Population (district level) 354,896 202,658 514,190 38,136 




Table 4: Results: Payroll share 
MODEL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable Payroll 
share 
Payroll share Payroll share Payroll share Payroll share Payroll share 
Sample Full sample Small groups Large groups Full sample Full sample Full sample 
TaxDt -0.430*** -0.689*** 0.0381 -0.406** -0.489*** -0.481** 
 (0.164) (0.195) (0.189) (0.176) (0.170) (0.235) 
TaxDt x Small groupt    -0.108   
    (0.194)   
TaxDt x      -0.00354  
Establishmentst     (0.539)  
TaxD x      -0.105 
LN(Establishmentst)      (0.126) 
Investment sharet-2 0.0105*** 0.00977*** 0.000217 0.00860*** 0.00977*** 0.00598*** 
 (0.00247) (0.00276) (0.00448) (0.00239) (0.00245) (0.00234) 
Revenue sharet-2 -0.0419*** -0.0404*** -0.0680*** -0.0494*** -0.0435*** -0.0539*** 
 (0.00812) (0.00937) (0.0145) (0.00793) (0.00802) (0.00773) 
Payroll sharet-2 0.240*** 0.203*** 0.160*** 0.220*** 0.236*** 0.210*** 
 (0.00935) (0.0112) (0.0154) (0.00893) (0.00925) (0.00881) 
Unemployment 0.00288*** 0.00456*** 0.00150** 0.00268*** 0.00310*** 0.00304** 
 (0.000654) (0.000915) (0.000733) (0.000625) (0.000646) (0.000612) 
GDP per capita -0.0194* -0.0295* -0.0109 -0.0194* -0.0194* -0.0179* 
 (0.0104) (0.0172) (0.0100) (0.0102) (0.0103) (0.00970) 
Population -0.00315 -0.00549 -0.00305 -0.000996 -0.00240 0.000201 
 (0.00810) (0.0104) (0.0117) (0.00782) (0.00775) (0.00750) 
Small groupt    0.144***   
    (0.00486)   
Establishmentst     -0.00224***  
     (0.000131)  
LN(Establishmentst)      -0.139*** 
      (0.00356) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Establishment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 90,678 52,542 38,136 90,678 90,678 90,678 
Overall R2 0.688 0.502 0.393 0.616 0.494 0.505 
Within R2 0.0863 0.0607 0.0439 0.161 0.106 0.212 
Notes: Regressions are calculated by OLS with establishment fixed effects and year fixed effects. Heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors are clustered by stock level and documented in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. A detailed description of the dependent 




Table 5: Results: Factor allocation and tax avoidance (small-group subsample) 















TaxDt -0.118 -0.633*** -0.545*** -0.929***
 (0.176) (0.178) (0.204) (0.265) 
TaxDt-1   -0.0962 -0.529**  
     (0.189) (0.251)    
Investment sharet-2 0.0114*** 0.00912*** 0.00264 -0.0271*** 0.0112*** -0.00520 
 (0.00220) (0.00263) (0.00330) (0.00639) (0.00304) (0.00440)
Revenue sharet-2 0.00908 -0.000416 0.229*** 0.0734*** 0.0461*** -0.145***
 (0.00734) (0.00654) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.00718) (0.00954)
Yt-2 0.144*** 0.0390*** -0.00348  
 (0.0102) (0.00856) (0.006909  
Unemployment -0.00190*** 0.000214 -0.00239** -0.00260 0.00339*** 0.00663***
 (0.000664) (0.000973) (0.000999) (0.00177) (0.00118) (0.00145)
GDP per capita 0.0247 0.000246 0.0509*** 0.00953 0.0126 -0.0568**
 (0.0155) (0.0156) (0.0194) (0.0321) (0.0178) (0.0225) 
Population -0.0174* -0.000825 -0.0163 -0.00733 -0.00679 0.0117 
 (0.00905) (0.0112) (0.0105) (0.0187) (0.0132) (0.0121) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Establishment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 52,542 52,542 52,542 52,542 52,542 52,542 
Overall R2 0.720 0.139 0.744 0.0952 0.0910 0.402 
Within R2 0.0787 0.178 0.0935 0.00346 0.106 0.0528 
Notes: Regressions are calculated by OLS with establishment fixed effects and year fixed effects. Heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors are clustered by stock level and documented in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. A detailed description of the dependent 
and independent variables is provided by Table 2. 
 
Table 6: Results: Factor allocation and tax avoidance (full sample) 















TaxDt 0.0757 -0.314** -0.250 -0.527***
 (0.153) (0.151) (0.163) (0.199) 
TaxDt-1   0.155 -0.0913  
     (0.144) (0.189)    
Investment sharet-2 0.0124*** 0.0126*** 0.00206 -0.0112*** 0.0142*** -0.000159
 (0.00203) (0.00232) (0.00294) (0.00532) (0.00259) (0.00373)
Revenue sharet-2 0.00845 0.0190*** 0.244*** 0.121*** 0.0584*** -0.111***
 (0.00671) (0.00131) (0.00803) (0.00835) (0.00625) (0.00742)
Yt-2 0.183*** 0.0771*** 0.0363*** 0.194***
 (0.00919) (0.00740) (0.00634) (0.00670)
Unemployment -0.00140*** -0.000347 -0.00177** -0.00135 0.00173** 0.00378***
 (0.000523) (0.000652) (0.000711) (0.00110) (0.000747) (0.000980)
GDP per capita 0.0147 0.00790 0.0244** 0.000258 0.0100 -0.0346**
 (0.00940) (0.00910) (0.0114) (0.0179) (0.0102) (0.0133) 
Population -0.0105 -0.00653 -0.0105 0.00219 -0.0130 0.00378 
 (0.00732) (0.00738 (0.00761) (0.0132) (0.00841) (0.0903) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Establishment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 90,678 90,678 90,678 90,678 90,678 90,678 
Overall R2 0.800 0.331 0.784 0.368 0.270 0.438 
Within R2 0.107 0.134 0.108 0.00901 0.0879 0.0570 
Notes: Regressions are calculated by OLS with establishment fixed effects and year fixed effects. Heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors are clustered by stock level and documented in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. A detailed description of the dependent 




Table 7: Robustness checks: Payroll share 
MODEL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable Payroll share Payroll share Payroll share Payroll share Payroll share Payroll share 
Robustness check Controls Controls Timing Timing FRevenue FRevenue 
TaxDt -0.381*** -0.657***   -0.428*** -0.684*** 
 (0.185) (0.212)   (0.164) (0.195) 
TaxDt-1   -0.251** -0.449***   
   (0.128) (0.155)   
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Establishment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Establishment controls No  No Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Regional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 90,678 52,542 90,678 52,542 90,678 52,542 
Within R2 0.00550 0.00619 0.692 0.516 0.686 0.496 
Overall R2 0.00446 0.00468 0.0859 0.0599 0.0863 0.0609 
Notes: Regressions are calculated by OLS with establishment fixed effects and year fixed effects. Heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors are clustered by stock level and documented in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. A detailed description of the dependent 
and independent variables is provided by Table 2. 
 
Table 8: Robustness checks: Factor allocation and tax avoidance – establishment controls 
MODEL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












Panel A: Small-group subsample 
TaxDt -0.0830 -0.630*** -0.533*** -0.975***
 (0.195) (0.180) (0.206) (0.295) 
TaxDt-1  -0.0657 -0.515**  
    (0.225) (0.253)    
Observations 52,542 52,542 52,542 52,542 52,542 52,542 
Overall R2 0.00411 0.0942 0.00509 0.0952 0.0473 0.00240 
Within R2 0.00204 0.175 0.00153 0.00346 0.102 0.00523 
Panel B: Full sample 
TaxDt 0.130 -0.300* -0.208 -0.560** 
 (0.455) (0.157) (0.170) (0.219) 
TaxDt-1  0.237 -0.0498  
    (0.176) (0.198)    
Observations 90,678 90,678 90,678 90,678 90,678 90,678 
Overall R2 0.00499 0.0432 0.00405 0.00186 0.0249 4.06e-07 
Within R2 0.00367 0.118 0.00255 0.00210 0.0751 0.00417 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Establishment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Establishment controls No No No No No No 
Regional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Regressions are calculated by OLS with establishment fixed effects and year fixed effects. Heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors are clustered by stock level and documented in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. A detailed description of the dependent 
and independent variables is provided by Table 2. Panel A refers to the small-group sample (firms with less than 4 




Table 9: Robustness checks: Factor allocation and tax avoidance – timing effects 
MODEL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












Panel A: Small-group subsample 
TaxDt  -0.182 -0.448  
  (0.229) (0.285)  
TaxDt-1 0.0745 -0.229 -0.400** -0.470** 
 (0.139) (0.144) (0.168) (0.218) 
Observations 52,542 52,542 52,542 52,542 52,542 52,542 
Overall R2 0.725 0.142 0.743 0.102 0.0900 0.409 
Within R2 0.0786 0.177 0.0935 0.00339 0.106 0.0521 
Panel B: Full sample 
TaxDt  0.116 -0.099  
    (0.181) (0.217)    
TaxDt-1 0.192 -0.0592 -0.152 -0.258 
 (0.117) (0.119)   (0.132) (0.164) 
Observations 90,678 90,678 90,678 90,678 90,678 90,678 
Overall R2 0.798 0.336 0.785 0.368 0.270 0.442 
Within R2 0.107 0.134 0.107 0.00901 0.0879 0.0568 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Establishment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Establishment controls No No No No No No 
Regional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Regressions are calculated by OLS with establishment fixed effects and year fixed effects. Heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors are clustered by stock level and documented in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. A detailed description of the dependent 
and independent variables is provided by Table 2. Panel A refers to the small-group sample (firms with less than 4 
establishments) and Panel B refers to the full sample. 
 
Table 10: Robustness checks: Factor allocation and tax avoidance – foreign sales revenue 
MODEL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












Panel A: Small-group subsample 
TaxDt -0.120 -0.634*** -0.550*** -1.240***
 (0.176) (0.178) (0.204) (0.256) 
TaxDt-1  0.0115 -0.538**  
    (0.176) (0.251)    
Observations 52,542 52,542 52,542 52,542 52,542 52,542 
Overall R2 0.720 0.140 0.769 0.120 0.0927 0.417 
Within R2 0.0789 0.178 0.0984 0.00384 0.106 0.0529 
Panel B: Full sample 
TaxDt 0.0743 -0.316** -0.253 -0.748***
 (0.153) (0.151) (0.163) (0.194) 
TaxDt-1  0.218 -0.101  
    (0.137) (0.189)    
Observations 90,678 90,678 90,678 90,678 90,678 90,678 
Overall R2 0.800 0.332 0.798 0.379 0.271 0.436 
Within R2 0.107 0.134 0.114 0.00974 0.0883 0.0579 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Establishment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Establishment controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Regressions are calculated by OLS with establishment fixed effects and year fixed effects. Heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors are clustered by stock level and documented in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. A detailed description of the dependent 
and independent variables is provided by Table 2. Panel A refers to the small-group sample (firms with less than 4 
establishments) and Panel B refers to the full sample. 
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